9 A feminist analysis of UN Security Council resolutions on women, peace, and security

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Contrary to what we thought we had reason to hope for, the fall of the Berlin Wall did not bring about a peace dividend and the post-Cold War world did not see a demilitarization of politics. Worldwide military structures strive for new purposes and designs and seek to convince a remarkably skeptical public of their value and worth. War and warfare have not been successfully delegitimized, but are (re)cast as part of the normalcy of a nation meeting its noblest obligations. Correspondingly, the concepts of security and threat have seen great changes. Ever since its appearance in the 1990s in development as well as in military discourse, human security serves as a new reference point for war and peace efforts. At the same time as casting development in the highly ambivalent frame of security, human security offers a gateway for social and gender differentiation. This in turn allows the human rights discourse and feminist perspectives to make demands on the security sector. Thus, on national and international levels the security sector sees itself confronted with the gender mainstreaming mandates articulated in the Beijing Platform for Action which all governments had signed and the international women’s movements had vigorously lobbied for.

The debate on and the reality of “failed states” and “new wars” brought to the fore two features of the globalized world which both carry a gender dimension: (a) the increased number of states incapable of providing the public good security; and (b) the failure of development to create sufficient jobs and, as a consequence, rising numbers of un- and underemployment. Ever increasing masses of young men, deprived of regular sources of income and deprived of civil forms of functioning
as family providers, seek to manifest their masculinity in forms of more or less organized violence. Both may well and all too often do conjure to violent-prone forms of conflict settlement. Where the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence of the state is eroded and legal forms of employment or sufficient assets to secure an income are hard to come by, men may easily be drawn into illegal, potentially violent ways of making a living.

There is a growing body of literature on gender and violent conflict and the impact of gender patterns in the various conflict phases. On a conceptual level by and large a feminist concept of gender has gained ground which extends beyond the gender-differentiation of social reality into a normative critique of gender asymmetries and the quest for emancipatory transformation. On an empirical level it is now generally acknowledged that men and women experience violent conflict and war in significantly different ways, and concepts of masculinity and femininity and of a “proper” and “fitting” gender order play a major role in all phases of violent conflict.

In line with United Nations (UN) parlance, conflict phases usually are defined in terms of conflict escalation, open conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. When the UN Security Council passed its resolutions with regard to gender it did so primarily relating to the post-conflict phase and concerned with “the importance of involving women in all peace-keeping and peacebuilding measures” as noted in Security Council Resolution 1325. By and large the focus on peace processes and the various types of multidimensional peace operations is maintained in the by now five UN Security Council resolutions usually discussed summarily under the heading of “Women, Peace, and Security.” These are Security Council Resolutions 1325 (31 October 2000), 1820 (19 June 2008), 1888 (30 September 2009), 1889 (5 October 2009), and 1960 (16 December 2010). After discussing their content and main thrust the question will be raised, if, along with an increased emphasis on sexual violence, a shift to a discourse of victimhood and a loss of agency ascription is discernible. This then obliges us to reconsider gender mainstreaming with a view to its meaning in different settings and its status as an encompassing meta-strategy.

**UN resolutions on women, peace, and security**

The story of the making of Security Council Resolution 1325 has been frequently recounted, if differently interpreted. There is consensus that it took an as yet unique effort of sustained networking and lobbying between women’s and human rights organizations, individual office holders of UN member states, agencies and networks of women advocates within the UN-system, and the emergence of thematic resolutions to build a case and offer a wording which eventually resulted in the unanimous adoption of the resolution. Women activists and feminists express pride and satisfaction for having successfully moved “women and armed conflict” on the main agenda of international security.

Resolution 1325 addresses four areas:

- equal representation and participation of women in all stages of peace processes and in all UN field-based operations, aspiring to a 50/50 gender balance;
- mainstreaming a gender perspective in all activities of peace processes and reconstruction;
- recognition of the particular needs of women and girls and protection from gender-based violence; and
- an end to impunity regarding sexual and other violence against women and girls and the exclusion of such crimes from post-war amnesties.

The actors addressed range from all operating units within the UN system to member states and local conflicting parties.

Resolution 1325 does mention sexual violence as well as the need to protect women and girls and demands an end to impunity for such acts. Its main thrust, however, lies with representation and participation. The resolution carefully avoids essentialism and remains strictly on the level of the practicalities of gendered communication. It stresses the importance for a gender balance of experiences and perspectives to inform and guide the peace process. The resolution has been translated into over 80 languages and has become a key reference point for women’s organizations around the world. However, the pace of implementation is felt to be lamentably slow. Even though guidelines, handbooks, check lists, training manuals and the like have been elaborated, gender components are built into the training of peace forces, gender advisors and focal points have been put into place, the actual representation of women in UN-peace formations remains low.

One important reason why male career models and systematic barriers for women in peace and security are allowed to persist is seen in the absence of accountability mechanisms in the resolution. National action plans are hoped to provide a remedy. Nine years after the adoption of Resolution 1325, Resolution 1889 expresses “deep concern about the under-representation of women in all stages of peace processes.” Resolution 1889 requests the General Secretary to submit indicators within six months which could serve as a common basis for monitoring the
implementation of Resolution 1325, both within the UN system and in member states. By April 2010 a set of altogether 26 “Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound” (SMART) indicators had been elaborated.

Following reports of the Secretary-General on 1325 with a focus on violence against women and the 2006 in-depth report and resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, activities within the UN system were stepped up. The “UN Action against sexual violence in conflict” at the beginning of 2007 united 13 UN agencies under the call “Stop rape now.” In February 2008 the UN Secretary-General’s campaign UNITA to End Violence against Women, 2008–15 was launched. In June 2008 Resolution 1820 was passed, like the previous one by unanimous vote. While it refers to Resolution 1325, its primary concern is with sexual violence. The resolution “stresses that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security.” It reiterates the need to stop impunity, exclude sexual violence from amnesty provisions, and demands a “policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping operations.”

The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) prioritizes the stipulations of Resolution 1820 in the following order:

- sexual violence is recognized as a tactic of war and therefore constitutes an immediate issue of international peace and security;
- as such it requires a security response through sanctions and field staff sensitization;
- all parties to armed conflict are to adopt concrete action regarding protection and prevention to end sexual violence; and
- the importance of women's participation in all processes and measures ending sexual violence in conflict as well as in peace talks is reconfirmed.10

The resolution does mention the need to have women participate in peacekeeping structures and processes of the UN, member states, and on the level of the localities of intervention, but its main concern clearly lies with protection. In fact, the European Union (EU) considered protection of women, prevention and response to sexual violence “the weakest pillar of the implementation of Resolution 1325.”11

A little over a year later, following the Secretary-General's reports on Resolution 1820 and on Resolution 1325, both with a focus on sexual violence, Resolution 1888 was passed and opened on a highly troubled note: Security Council members remained “deeply concerned over the lack of progress on the issue of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict in particular against women and children, notably against girls.” The resolution reaffirms the urgent need for action in the area of protection and prevention as “inaction can send a message that the incidence of sexual violence in conflicts is tolerated.” It also demands the appointment of “a Special Representative to provide coherent and strategic leadership” through cooperation with the inter-agency “UN Action against sexual violence in conflict.” In February 2010 Margot Wallström, former member of the European Commission from Sweden, took up the position of Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict. Passed in December 2010, Resolution 1960 re-endorses the concern “over the slow process in the issue of sexual violence” and requests the Secretary General to report annually. The request relates exclusively to Resolutions 1820 and 1888 and does not include Resolution 1325.

**Shift of focus?**

In 2002, commissioned by UNIFEM, Ellen Sirleaf, President of Liberia and recent winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, together with Elisabeth Rehn, former Minister of Defense in Finland, evaluated the implementation of Resolution 1325. They criticized the identification of gender with women and girls and the absence of an analysis of gender orders and their dynamics.12 The observation points to a contradiction which has marked Resolution 1325 from the start and has been somewhat reinforced in the subsequent resolutions. The majority of the wide and manifold efforts pursued under the thematic umbrella of “Women, Peace, and Security” focuses predominantly on the situation of women with little attention to the gender dimensions of organizational structures and policy orientations. Despite available knowledge inspired by feminist theory regarding the gendered terrain of violent conflict, few of these insights inform the Security Council and its resolutions. On the contrary, particularly under the impact of systematic mass rape in Darfur and Congo, a shift towards addressing the victimhood of women and stressing their special need of protection is noticeable. Sexual violence against women moves center stage. So much so that nine years after the adoption of Resolution 1325 and one year after Resolution 1820, Resolution 1889 finds it necessary to “stress[ing] the need to focus not only on the protection of women but also on their empowerment in peacebuilding.” Clearly, there is a growing concern that the attention to sexual violence might contribute to a recasting of women
in the mold of vulnerability and victims requiring protection and, by the same token, sideling the claim of empowerment and participation that is crucial in Resolution 1325.

Governmental as well as civil society actors alike consider the five resolutions as forming part of one consistent policy thrust. Yet, as multilateral and bilateral actors engage in implementation processes, we observe a shift of focus. Norway, for example, in 2010 established a Gender, Peace, and Security Unit of two years’ duration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The unit, a pre-project in the context of a defense and security sector reform program, welcomes “the increased focus on Resolution 1820 on sexual violence” which is finally and rightly considered a weapon of war, just like other conventional weapons and methods in warfare. This in turn allows “to promote a strong security perspective,” a perspective to be defended against “a broad perspective on violence against women, based on the argument that sexual violence is not limited to being a problem only in war.” In other words, theories basing their analysis on a continuum of violence might very well be valid, but are felt to be of little use in the specific context of violent conflict and post-conflict activities. If such theories and approaches are taken as a point of reference, “we will end up watering down the available measures and the responsibility of the commanders, the politicians, and the generals, and the whole possibility of holding them accountable to international law disappears.” Prevention of sexual violence reduces the subsequent costs of reconstruction and “recruiting women improves the quality and effectiveness of military operations as well as the security of the forces.” Thus, focusing on violence against women in conflict is felt to provide a promising strategy successfully to move women from the soft policy area of women’s issues to the hard issues of international security. UNIFEM endorses this view: “Positioning sexual violence as a security issue broadens the constituency making it easier to engage security actors for meaningful impact.” In addition, such a strategic positioning might draw the support of those states who are unwilling to underwrite the entire human rights- and equality-based gender mainstreaming agenda, but are ready to condemn sexual violence.

Women’s organizations and feminist activists are unhappy about the construction of women as a special group in need of protection as it re-victimizes them and jumbles them in the quasi-homogenous category “vulnerable.” Peacebuilding actors are likely to lose sight of women’s agency and to miss out on interaction with local women’s groups and their quiet, yet vital contribution to conflict transformation. The corresponding gender discourse tends to re-animate the old social construct of the male protector. Placing women in a position of vulnerable victims privileges established military and security actors and sidelines participation and empowerment. The logic of patriarchal protection and women’s subordination is reinstalled.

By the same token the binary construction of victim and perpetrator all too easily hides the structures of subordination operating within a patriarchal system. The focus lies on injury caused to the victim and “aberrant behavior” on the part of the perpetrator(s) to be attributed to war deprivations and to be prevented, ranged in or disciplined by zero-tolerance strategies and judicial action. The “patriarchal dividend” remains firmly obscured, the systematic advantage that is, which men as a group enjoy. As a consequence, there is no room for empowerment strategies. The projection of women as potential victims suggests protection and submission to the terms coming with it as primary, if not sole solution. The results come across as unconvincing either way. Neither are women effectively protected, as the recent mass rapes in Congo near a UN base in the year 2010 once again demonstrated, nor did the major signatories to the resolutions object when the 2009 Afghan National Stability and Reconciliation Law offered amnesty options that included sexual violence, rape, and abuse.

In short, we see serious discursive collateral damage: the gendered structure of social contexts is sidelined and the construction of masculinities and femininities obscured. The gender dynamics of conflict with militarized masculinity and politicized femininity have little chance to inform analysis and strategy. The “special relationship” between men and weapons and the frequently observed tendency of post-war societies to seek reassurance of “normalcy” in decidedly conservative gender orders are obscured. The end of impunity for gender-based violence repeatedly called for remains on the individual level; there is not even a hint at a societal analysis of the underlying gendered power imbalances.

If we take the five resolutions as one ensemble seeking to gender mainstream the theme of women, peace, and security into international policies, is the concern justified that over a decade a shift from empowerment to protection has occurred? Are concepts of agency and transformative strategies collateral damage of a focus on sexualized violence, without the latter in fact (Darfur, Congo) being combated effectively? The very wording of the reminding and reinforcing resolutions adopted in 2009 could well be read to that effect. They stress both gender mainstreaming and empowerment, with a frequency and urgency absent in the “mother” resolutions. There are many indications that this reflects the experiences and apprehensions of women’s organizations and feminist activists, including the fear that civil society actors, i.e., women’s organizations themselves, might be somewhat marginalized.
However, there is also a more optimistic view. It attributes high value and relevance to the fact that “women’s direct participation and the inclusion of their interests” have been acknowledged as a valid issue on the security agenda. This, in conjunction with the participation stipulations of the resolutions, is considered to open “space where women can assume leadership and political power.” Therefore, “despite the usual lip service from official bodies in response to these measures, activists have been able to widen the political space for women’s peacebuilding and have developed new paradigms.” According to this perspective gender mainstreaming has achieved regulatory effects in that it forms an integral part of security policy debates and has successfully been integrated into the operation directives of all relevant agencies. There are gender statistics, gender training and sensitization. There are efforts to recruit more women into the ranks of peace and security institutions and organizations. And the administrative apparatus of UN security governance is equipped with gender units, gender advisors, focal points and the like. Following this view, for all practical purposes, gender has become a “leitmotif” of UN peace operations.

Systemic limitations to gender mainstreaming

Ever since the adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995 gender mainstreaming has been read as expressing the claim that women’s issues be transformed into societal issues. In interaction with the authorities that has meant that gender mainstreaming has become the primary vehicle and valid instrument to struggle for gender-just discursive, social and political practices. Since then and indeed since long before gender mainstreaming reached the area of peace and security, feminist debates have expressed much disillusionment with the strategy and seriously questioned its value. In its field of origin, development policy, it soon turned out to be an “elusive agenda.” In merging an integrative approach with a transformative claim the dominant policy frame continues to write the script with at best rhetorical and statistically marginal concessions to the ill-fitting gender quest. Many women’s organizations and feminist activists seek a profound revisiting of gender mainstreaming. Transformative strategies require a radical analysis of global power structures and have to include the realization that gender power relations are a predisposing cause to the use of violence. In the area of peace and security there are two important aspects of immediate and direct pertinence to gender mainstreaming which are discussed surprisingly little. These regard (a) the nature and quality of participation; and (b) the nature into which the stream gender is to be integrated or that it is supposed to transform, that is, the liberal peace agenda.

Participation

With gender mainstreaming, a social movement addresses the mechanisms of state agencies and, in the area of peace and security, does so in a realm steeped in patriarchal, hierarchical thinking in practice and theory alike. The very sexual contract that Carole Pateman analyzes as lying at the base of state formation shapes, in structure and prevailing attitudes, the actors called upon to provide protection and to respect equality. Androcentric features and a male work culture shaping the inner life of institutions and organizations certainly work, by all accounts are even accentuated, in the peace and security sector. The dynamics of decision making within institutions and their operating mode is deeply entrenched with the patriarchal gender order. Gender hierarchies and male-bonding mold prevalent norms, criteria for bestowing legitimacy, procedural requirements, career patterns, achievement criteria, expectations and informal cultural mores. In the field of peace and security even more so than in others it is virtually impossible to expose inner-institutional blockages and to take recourse to external movement constituencies or to the general public. This constitutes a major impediment to meaningful participation at the same time that it tends to individualize and silence relevant experiences made within institutions.

The debate revolving around the five women, peace, and security UN resolutions appears to take participation per se as an, as it were, self-guaranteed stepping stone to personal empowerment and transformative influence. Yet, it is by no means evident that the encounter between women and the security apparatus generates empowering interaction and negotiations and that a gender perspective stands a chance. In fact more often than not participation comes with a high price, undermining original political positions, eroding personalities or simply gatekeeping gender advocates in “their” niche. The functional arguments for participation—e.g., women get easier access to local women and by implication to local gender realities—may well be true. But there is also truth in the repeated, if anecdotal, evidence we receive from gender advisors in military and police settings on the difficulties they face in getting access to the higher echelons they are to report to. Finally, representation of women by quantitative participation is not necessarily identical with power of voice. While the statistical record simulates participation, in fact women in peace consultations may be expected
Liberal peace

Feminist development discourse has long moved to a critical in-depth analysis of corporate-driven globalization with its social polarization on international and national levels, eroding the fabric of societies and destabilizing governments and states. While in continuous communication and interaction with feminists in academe, much of the critical theory-building derived from the experience of working inside and with the women’s machineries created during and after the UN decade of women in aid agencies as well as in recipient countries. Increasingly programs and policies designed to “fight poverty” target women, e.g., by virtue of the much celebrated micro-credits. In the process the term “empowerment” was reframed by aid agencies and became synonymous with economic empowerment. Introduced into the politics of the international women’s movements in 1985 by Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), a network of feminist activists and researchers, as a marker for an emancipatory process, empowerment has since come to denote the self-management of the marginalized.37

Therefore, to the women’s movements in developing countries gender mainstreaming quickly has become part and parcel of the neoliberal agenda of macroeconomics and macropolitics of structural adjustment. This is in stark contrast to the world of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), certainly to Europe, where gender mainstreaming encountered and was absorbed into an equality discourse and the fairly developed institutional mechanisms of the member countries of the EU. This discourse to this day does not necessarily take issue with the economic and political mainstream, but rather focuses on making inroads into gender imbalances. However, more recently feminist critics of neo-classical political economy38 have raised questions concerning the kind of peace multi-dimensional peacemaking is pursuing and the nature of its making. In this perspective the concepts of peace and reconstruction are analyzed as framed by the dominant globalization agenda, prescribing certain strategies and excluding others. As much as liberal peace and post-war reconstruction are vividly debated in the peace research and in the “peace community, by all appearances the issue has not yet figured prominently in the Women, Peace, and Security discourse based on the five Security Council resolutions.

There are in fact critical issues to be dealt with. The (neo)liberal grammar underlying the liberal peace agenda spells out the guiding concepts of human rights and citizenship, democracy and free market, civil society and government, nation and state, and their place in the international order. This reading of the human rights concept prioritizes individual rights and political citizenship with elections as a centerpiece of political reconstruction, downplaying social and economic rights in the process. Usually, the transition into a post-conflict situation is not accompanied by reforms designed to undo or only curtail the—formal and informal, legal and illegal—socio-economic power structures, alliances and networks that the war has generated and fuelled. As a consequence, warlords and war profiteers re-enter the scene in the shape of successful business men and politicians ready to profit from open markets with their well-established global connections.

The liberal peacebuilding paradigm with its projection of a threefold transformation to peace, democracy and market economy as a self-sustaining process is reminiscent of the one-size-fits-all approach of structural adjustment. Under the circumstances locally resonant forms, strategies, and visions of peacebuilding which women often engage in may well find it difficult to be acknowledged.39

Tensions and perspectives

We do not find much evidence that the debate on Resolution 1325 and the following resolutions goes beyond the discursive space delineated by the paradigm of liberal peace. The terms framing reconstruction and recovery are rarely the subject of discussion. The fact that the liberal frame remains beyond debate or even challenge may well be due to a combination of genuine common ground and a heavy dose of seeking connectivity to the dominant model of development and to those who wield power in it. Quite possibly the silence is driven by the genuine desire to secure empowerment and transformation through participation and protection.40 This raises the question: Is the Women, Peace, and Security agenda condemned to navigate within the dominant neoliberal frame in a similar fashion as was suggested by Anne Sisson Runyan41 more than 10 years ago referring to the Beijing agenda? Is the gender mainstreaming debate surrounding the five resolutions inadvertent, but necessarily, part and parcel of a hegemonic claim patterned on far-reaching but narrow-minded universalist aspirations? Is the shift to victimhood and protection not only responding to the
increase of sexualized violence in conflict regions, but also conducive to a tacit compromise with the conservative images of society and gender order underlying the neoliberal vision of the world? Is the complicity with the dominant agenda that much of gender mainstreaming on European and national levels has evolved into re-enacted on international levels? Can gender mainstreaming in peace and security find entry points into institutional practices other than the windows of opportunity offered, or rather permitted, by a human resources management that seeks to optimize gender-specific differences for the purposes of increasing organizational effectiveness and efficiency? The debate has only just begun and is far from having settled into a unifying consensus.

One line of argument demands to reset the debate in the continuum of violence ranging from societal structures of discrimination and subordination to violence in private and public spheres to war. Even though the types of violence in each context vary greatly and in terms of damage inflicted may defy comparison, on a structural level one predisposes the other. Sexual violence against women as an instrument of war would not be possible without women being objectified, denigrated and suppressed in civil life. On a normative and theoretical level this is entirely consistent with the gender relevance of the human rights frame reaffirmed by the World Conference on Human Rights in 1993. At that occasion it was stated in clear terms that the entire human rights agenda safeguarding the dignity and the physical integrity without limitations applies to women and the specific forms of violation of human rights they may encounter. On a practical level, the exigencies and conditioning factors of focused action tend to turn out much more limited. This certainly is the experience in development policy. In the 1990s Gender in Development theory began to subscribe to the differentiation between practical and strategic gender needs. In the struggle for development interventions to actually meet the practical needs of women time and again strategic issues are sidelined, if not warded off altogether for allegedly dangerously overloading the agenda.

It is precisely this continuum and the politically unmanageable width of the axis which is reflected in past and present debates and bifurcations. Ever since the 1970s, peace movements have been influenced by Johan Galtung’s juxtaposition of structural and direct violence and the corresponding notions of positive and negative peace. We see the resurgence of that same juxtaposition in the human security debate in the form of a wider concept of human security encompassing whole systems of well-being as first posited by the UN Development Program (UNDP) in its 1994 Human Development Report, and a narrower concept confined to physical integrity. While on a theoretical level the concepts of structural violence, positive peace and social well-being are of great analytical and normative value, when it comes to strategizing and defining action they may be far too interventionist.

At this juncture, critical peace researchers remind us of the fact that the local and its political, economic, social, customary, cultural and spiritual dynamics are all too often ignored. Whether speaking from a post-colonial perspective or coming from a social justice tradition they agree on the need for more space for local agency and strategies more resonant with the social and political visions shared on local levels. Drawing on Michael Walzer’s distinction between thick and thin moral arguments in defense of a just war, Richmond suggests “thin cosmological norms and thick local expectations from where a social contract must emanate.” Peacebuilding must allow for the space to accommodate emergent local-liberal forms of hybridity including local concepts of political legitimacy and forms of organizing political power different from the Western model. In order to do so, it must proceed with great analytical sharpness and practical flexibility.

Unfortunately there has been remarkably little dialogue between critical peace studies and their analysis of the pitfalls of liberal peace with social movements, in particular women’s organizations, and their claims for inclusive citizenship. The sweeping dismissal of a universalist frame of reference as part of a hegemonic design ignores that in many ways the conflict between universal reach and local significance, between the historical roots and present validity of human rights (Genesis und Geltung) has long been resolved. The women’s movements of the world for once have insisted on the human rights frame as relevant for their struggles against subordination of whichever shape and reasoning. In given power settings and embedded by actors of peacebuilding who undoubtedly subscribe to the liberal peace agenda it is indeed extremely difficult to find out what “local-liberal forms of hybridity” could bring to the agenda of rebalancing subordinating gender relationships.

On a more general note, much of the disappointment with gender mainstreaming is brought about by high expectations, if not a strategic overload, which it may be time to review. The Beijing Platform for Action lays down essential objectives of international women’s policy and, as a matter of methodological procedure, requires from all those in authority systematic self-information on gender effects and gender-differentials of their actions. The wording does not suggest that gender mainstreaming as such is expected to encompass all the objectives of the platform. As a strategic and tactical move it is certainly legitimate to charge gender mainstreaming to the fullest. But there does remain an obvious tension between integrative approach and transformative
claim, possibly stronger than anywhere else in the male, hierarchic world of established security actors.

Perhaps the time has come to consider a strategic unbundling. Perhaps we ought to take a step back and reconsider what gender mainstreaming can achieve in general and in peace and security in particular, and where, without abandoning or discounting gender mainstreaming, complementary or independent strategies are called for. The role that UN Women should play in this re-consideration is to insist on a concept of human rights that under all circumstances takes issue with the violations of women's physical integrity and well-being. Such violations and infringements are embedded in deeply entrenched gendered power imbalances and need to be confronted unwaveringly.

Notes


4 The five resolutions can be accessed at http://www.peacewomen.org/themes_theme.php?id=65&subtheme=true.


14 Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Gender, Peace and Security Update, April and May–June, 2 (2010).

15 Ibid., 3.


17 Jan Arno Helfbrügge, “Frauen im Krieg. Krieg gegen Frauen. Die Vereinten Nationen und der Kampf gegen sexuelle Gewalt in bewaffneten Konflikten,” Vereinte Nationen 5 (2009): 212–16. Two aspects are neglected here: 1) Sexualized or gender-based violence tends to be thought of as violence inflicted by men on women. Sexual violence between men in the arena of war, by all appearances perceived as act of feminization, is shrouded in potent taboos and much less documented. 2) Women are not exclusively on the receiving end of violence. They may in many ways seek access to the actors of violence, approve of their action or even participate in violent acts themselves. See von Braunmühl, “Geschlechterdimensionen gewalttätige ausgetragener Konflikte in der Internationalen Politik.”


35 At an official function on Resolution 1325 in Berlin designed to present career role models to a public of mostly young women one of the few (former) female heads of a peace negotiation mission described in impressive detail how she was marginalized, cut-off from the flow of interaction and information and mopped into a position of servitude. Her career survived, and this is why she presented her experience as a positive example.

36 In Somalia UNDP funding for peace conferences was made conditional on the participation of women. The warlords brought in wives and relatives to enjoy the luxury of conference hotels and be silent. Similarly in Afghanistan warlords bowed to the participation stipulations of the Bonn Agreement, but, back in Kabul, commanded female representatives to be prudent—and quiet (participant’s report).


42 Moser and Clark, *Victims, Perpetrators or Actors?; Cockburn, From Where We Stand; Cathy McIlwaine, Multi-scalar Interpretations of the Gendered Continuum of Violence: Reflections from Colombia and Guatemala* (Mimeo, 2010).

47 For example, Kurtenbach, “Why is Liberal Peace-building so Difficult?”
49 Richmond, “Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace.”